Constitutional interpretation – An uneasy task: Article 88 in perspective

Constitutional interpretation – An uneasy task: Article 88 in perspective


One provision in the Constitution 1992 that has set judicial brains wrangling in the area of constitutional interpretation is article 88, particularly clauses 1 & 5. Like King Rex[i] in his zeal to transform the law, the Supreme Court continues ‘to make itself clearer in both directions’. In this article, the writer will endeavour to provide a historical background to article 88, consider some decisions touching on the provision and attempt to raise issues especially on interpretation pertaining to judicial functionaries.

PART A: Historical background to Article 88:

Article 88 is an audacious attempt to shift completely from the original common law position that the Crown was immune from legal suits.[ii] In the year 1234, Bracton is reported to have said:

“`Our lord King cannot be summoned or receive a command from anyone.’ The doctrine later found expression in the statement: ‘The King can do no wrong’.  The Crown was therefore not liable to be sued in tort, and this immunity protected the Crown from liability for acts done by the servants of the Crown; for if the King is not liable for personal negligence he cannot be brought under the ordinary rule by which a principal is liable for the acts of his agent, viz. qui facit per alium facit per se.”[iii]

As a result of this common law doctrine it was held in Tobin v. R.[iv] that a petition of right will not lie to recover compensation for the wrongful act of a servant of the Crown in the supposed performance of his duty.  

The Petition of Right

In the area of contract too, the crown could not be sued. When it became necessary for aggrieved contractors to obtain redress, they resorted to a petition of right which was given birth around 1860 -1862. Such a petitioner could only be heard in court after his petition had been endorsed with the words ‘fiat Justitia’ on the advice of the Attorney General and Home Secretary.[v]

In short, the petition of right was a leave obtained from the Crown authorities to seek redress in court. It was limited in scope as petitions could be brought for a breach of contract or restitution of property only and was not available for breach of public duty like trespass, negligence and other torts by Crown servants. It needs pointing out that where such acts were wrongful, the remedy was an action against the official as an individual and not in his official capacity.[vi] If the leave was granted and the petition is pursued, it was the Attorney General who filed a reply to the action on behalf of the Crown.

Application of the Petition of Rights in the Gold Coast

This common law doctrine undoubtedly applied in this country until Ghana attained a Republican status in 1960.[vii]

In 1877, the Petitions of Right Ordinance, 1877[viii] subsequently re-enacted by Cap. 18 (1951 Rev.) was passed to make provision relating to suits by and against the government of the Gold Coast and as to the course thereof.  Section 4 of the Ordinance provides:

All claims against the general Government of the Gold Coast, being of the same nature as claims which may be preferred against the Crown in England by petition, manifestation, or plea of right, may, with the consent of the Minister given in accordance with the advice of the Attorney-General be preferred in the proper Divisional Court of the Supreme Court in a suit instituted by the claimant as plaintiff against the Attorney-General as defendant, or such other officer as the Minister may from time to time designate for that purpose.”

The Crown Proceedings Act, 1947

When agitations against the Crown became intense in England, the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947[ix]  was passed. For once, the Crown could be sued for torts and there was no necessity for one to obtain a fiat and a petition of right to be able to do so. Section 2 rendered the Crown liable as though it was a natural person and under section 28, the courts, for the first time had the power to order disclosure of documents by the Crown and could order the Crown to answer requests for further information, except where they were ‘injurious to the public interest’.

The Crown Proceedings Act 1947 of the United Kingdom is mentioned here because in the words of Date Bah JSC in the case of The Republic v. High Court (Fast Track) Accra, Ex parte Attorney-General (Madam Maud Nongo – Interested Party),[x]  “… it has exerted an influence on Ghanaian law as well. Article 293 of the 1992 Constitution, which deals with claims against the Government, clearly follows in the trail blaze by the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947”. 

The State Proceedings Act, 1961 (Act 51)

Shortly after our attainment of a Republican status, the State Proceedings Act, 1961 (Act 51) was enacted. It repealed the Petitions of Right Ordinance, Cap. 18, but re-enacted some of its provisions and laid down the procedure to be followed when an action was intended to be instituted against the Republic.  The State Proceedings Act, 1961, also for the first time made the Republic liable for the wrongful acts of its servants and agents acting within the scope of their office or employment.[xi] 

The Public Officers Act, 1962

Parallel to the provisions of the State Proceedings Act, 1961, as regards the liability of the Republic for the acts of its servants was the Public Officers Act, 1962 which was also enacted. By these two legislations, a claimant could chose to sue the Republic for the wrongs of its servants in which case the provisions of the State Proceedings Act applied, and when the claimant elected to sue the servants personally, the Public Officers Act applied.[xii]

Before Ghana’s Republican Constitution in 1960, public officers in Ghana were servants of the Crown and because the Crown could not be sued for the acts and defaults of its servants, the Public Officers’ Protection Ordinance 1895 was passed in the Gold Coast to impose a time limit within which an action could be brought against public officers.  The Public Officers Act, 1962 (Act 114), repealed Cap. 27 (1951 Rev.), but retained the statutory limitation in favour of public officers until the Limitation Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 54), abolished this privilege.  It follows that this limitation has always been in favour of public officers when they are sued personally or individually because their employers, formerly the Crown, could not be sued.

Applicable provisions of the State Proceedings Act, (Act 51)

The relevant section of Act 51 was Section 10 (2) which read:

 “(2) Civil proceedings against the Republic may be instituted against the Attorney-General, or any officer authorised in that behalf by him or any officer specified in that behalf under any law for the time being in force”.

Application of the provision by the Court

The Court of Appeal prior to the enactment of the Constitution, 1992 in the case of Buobuh v. Minister of Interior[xiii]  relied on section 10 (2) of Act 51 (2) to hold that in an action against the State, the claimant could sue only one representative of the State – the Attorney-General or his authorized representative and that there was nothing permitting duality of defendants.

Constitutional Provision on the Attorney-General in civil suits

Article 88 (1), (4) & (5) of the Constitution, 1992 provides: 

“(1) There shall be an Attorney-General of Ghana who shall be a Minister of State and the principal legal adviser to the Government.

(4) All offences prosecuted in the name of the Republic of Ghana shall be at the suit of the Attorney-General or any other person authorised by him in accordance with any law.

(5) The Attorney-General shall be responsible for the institution and conduct of all civil cases on behalf of the State; and all civil proceedings against the State shall be instituted against the Attorney-General as defendant.”

The distinction between the provisions of the State Proceedings Act (Act 51) and the Constitution, 1992

It appears that whereas the State Proceedings Act provided that in an action against the Republic, the Attorney-General might be made a defendant, the Constitution on the other hand appeared to speak in mandatory terms.[xiv]

The distinction was drawn more clearer in the Delta Food’s case infra thus:
The next objection is founded on section 10 (2) of Act 51 and article 88 (5) of the Constitution 1992 Section 10(2) of Act 51 reads: “(2) Civil proceedings against the Republic may be instituted against the Attorney-General, or any officer authorised in that behalf by him or any officer specified in that behalf under any law for the time being in force.” And article 88(5) of the Constitution, 1992 also provides: “(5) The Attorney-General shall be responsible for the institution and conduct of all civil cases on behalf of the State; and all civil proceedings against the State shall be instituted against the Attorney-General as defendant.” Section 10 (2) of Act 51 uses the phrase “may be instituted” which shows that a plaintiff has an option to go either against the Attorney-General or the authorised office of the particular State body. But then article 88 (5) of the Constitution, 1992 categorically directs that the Attorney-General, and no one else, should be named the defendant in all civil proceedings against the State. In the face of article 88(5) of the Constitution, 1992 it cannot be doubted that suit No C495/98, being an action against the State, the Attorney-General and not the minister ought to have been made the defendant. “

The current State Proceedings Act 1998[xv]

To avoid the conflict in the Constitution and Act 51 and to give more bite to the provisions of the former, a new State Proceedings Act, Act 555 was passed in 1998.

The relevant provision of Act 555 is section 9 (1) which provides:

In accordance with article 88 of the Constitution, civil proceedings 

  • By the Republic shall be instituted and conducted on behalf of the Republic by the Attorney-General or a person authorized by the Attorney-General,
  • Against the Republic shall be instituted against the Attorney-General”.

Etymology of the phrase ‘Attorney-General’

According to Steven Pinker,[xvi] the etymology of the phrase ‘Attorney –General’ has its first citation in the Oxford English Dictionary from 1292. The phrase was borrowed from Anglo-Norman French when England was ruled by Normans after the Conquest in the 11th Century. The term was originally used to refer to any person who holds a general power of attorney to represent a principal in all matters. Civil law jurisdictions have similar offices, which may be variously called ‘public prosecutor general’, ‘procurators’, ‘advocates general’, public attorney’ and many more.


Initial Application of the Constitutional provision by the Court

In an action brought against the Minister for Food and Agriculture in the case of Republic v. High Court Accra, Ex parte Attorney General (Delta Foods Limited, Interested Party)[xvii] , the Supreme Court held that Article 88 (5) of the Constitution 1992 categorically directed the Attorney General and no one else to be named as the defendant in all civil proceedings against the State, by virtue of his functions as the principal legal adviser and the body responsible for the institution and conduct of all civil cases on behalf of the State. The Attorney-General does not assume liability as a defendant, but was only a nominal defendant. Therefore, the failure to name him as a defendant was not fatal to the action as an amendment could be effected at any time to substitute the named defendant.  

Action against a State Agency

In Ampratwum Manufacturing Co. Limited v. Divestiture Implementation Committee[xviii], the respondent was deemed as an advisory body and agency of the government to implement and execute Government policies in respect of divestiture programmes.

The Supreme Court speaking through Baffoe-Bonnie JSC quoted with approval Duose J. (As he then was) sitting at the Sekondi High Court in the case of Paul Nuako and 133 Others v. DIC[xix]  as follows,

As a matter of law, fact and practice therefore the D.I.C. is a mere advisory executive agent of the Government of Ghana without authority to take decisions of a finite nature. It is to do the pick axe and shovel work for government…. it has no capacity to sue and to be sued in its own right….…As such agent of the State, civil proceedings against it must be instituted against the Attorney General as Defendant”. The Apex Court thus ordered the Attorney General to be substituted for the respondent.

Who defends Instruments of State Lands Acquisitions?

For many years, the Land Commission entrusted with various functions by law including managing public lands has been litigating on its own. In the recent decision of Nene Dokutso Tei Kwabla v. Lands Commission & Volta (Gh.) Investment Co. Ltd.[xx] , the Supreme Court relying on Article 88 (5) decided that it is the Attorney-General’s duty to defend state acquisition instruments. His Lordship Appau JSC surmised:

If the central issue was in respect of the propriety of the 1968 Instrument as the Appellant is now contending, then the Attorney-General would have been the proper party to be sued for the determination of that issue but not the Lands Commission and the Respondent. This is so because the Lands Commission is a mere caretaker and manager of all public lands (including vested lands) for and on behalf of the State and must not be the one to contest the legality or propriety of the Instrument that acquired same. Article 88 (5) of the 1992 Constitution provides: “The Attorney-General shall be responsible for the institution and conduct of all civil cases on behalf of the State; and all civil proceedings against the State shall be ins1tituted against the Attorney-General as defendant”.                                                        

Action against the Chief Justice 

In the case of Tsatsu Tsikata v. Chief Justice & Attorney General,[xxi] the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret whether acts performed by the Chief Justice in the course of his duties were personal acts or official acts. Their Lordships held that the Chief Justice was a public officer appointed by the President in consultation with the Council of State and approval by Parliament so acts performed in pursuance of his functions were public acts. His Lordship Ampiah JSC noted: “Accordingly, as provided by article 88 (5), any attack on him in the performance of his duties needed to be defended by the Attorney-General on behalf of the State.” The decision to join him to the suit when the Attorney-General was already a party was not fatal, once that would effectively and effectually dispose of the matter.

Distinction drawn between the Judiciary & Legislature on one hand and other Independent Constitutional bodies on the other hand

After the case of Tsikata v. Chief Justice supra followed the case of Amegatcher v. Attorney-General (No. 1)) & Others[xxii] when the Supreme Court speaking through Atuguba JSC in adopting the purposive approach to Interpretation construed Article 88 (5) thus::

Consequently, we consider that, the time has come for a realistic revisit to article 88 (5) of the 1992 Constitution. Accordingly, we would come down on article 88 (5) as follows – all the constitutionally established independent bodies like the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, the Electoral Commission etc. can sue and be sued on their own relating to their functions per counsel of their own choice. Any person affected by an action involving the State can upon application be joined to such action to defend his or her interest. With regard to the Judiciary and the Legislature where their positions on an issue is in conflict with that of the Attorney-General, they may proceed on their own by counsel of their choice. However, any of these bodies referred to may access the services of the Attorney-General if they so choose”.

Bimpong-Buta’s Editorial Comments

Commenting on the decision, the Learned Editor of the Supreme Court of Ghana Law Report, Dr. S.Y. Bimpong-Buta of blessed memory formed the view that the Supreme Court by the Amegatcher’s decision had departed from the Tsikata case supra.

However, when the Apex Court got the opportunity to express itself in the case of Enyerem v. Logistics Inc. Limited and Others, it criticized the commentary of Bimpong-Buta at pages 680-681 which sought to create the impression that the Amegatcher’s case was a departure from the Tsikata’s case. His Lordship Dotse JSC explained: “Instead, the Amegatcher case is an improvement upon the Tsikata case with a window of hope for members of the Judiciary to opt for legal representation from the Attorney General or not.”[xxiii]

Actions against Judicial Officers

In the Enyerem case,[xxiv] the Supreme Court had to determine whether the Attorney-General can represent a Court Registrar in a litigation for acts done in the performance of his duties. His Lordship Dotse JSC who read the lead Judgment of the Court held that because the functions of the Court Registrar and for that matter a Judicial officer are done on behalf of the State, the Attorney-General has the right to represent him in Court. They created a window where the Registrar could choose to defend the matter by counsel of his own choice.

Action against the Judicial Secretary

In Justice Edward Boateng v. Judicial Secretary & Others[xxv], the Judicial Secretary was sued for writing a letter to the Judge interdicting him ostensibly on the instructions of the Chief Justice.[xxvi]

Recent pronouncement on the Chief Justice & The Judicial Council as parties

In the recent cases of Benjamin Yaw Osei v. The Chief Justice, Judicial Council and the Attorney General,[xxvii] the Supreme Court relied on the authorities of Tsatsu Tsikata v. Chief Justice & Attorney General[xxviii] & Amegatcher v. Attorney General (No. 1) & Others[xxix]  to hold that since the nature of the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff were declaratory, the Chief Justice and the Judicial Council were not necessary parties to the action. The court reiterated that the Chief Justice performed her functions as the administrative head of the Judiciary in dismissing the Plaintiff and did not do so in her personal capacity. Her official act which was presumed to be regularly performed was that of the State. 

The Apex Court speaking per Appau JSC emphasized that: “Her (the Chief Justice) defense could therefore be taken by the 3rd Defendant (i.e. the Attorney General) who represents the State in all civil and criminal actions by virtue of article 88 (5) of the Constitution, 1992”. 

In the case of the Judicial Council, His Lordship noted:

“The second Defendant is also in the same boat with the first Defendant. It is a Council with a large composition of eighteen (18) members established under the authority of the Constitution, 1992. It derives its power from article 154 of the Constitution. It has no authority to sue and be sued so any suit against the second defendant must be directed against the third defendant. We therefore order that the names of the first and second defendants be struck out from the suit since they are not necessary parties”.

From the authorities, we can summarize the principles relating to civil actions against the State under Article 88 (5) as follows:

  1. Where the action is against the Chief Justice or the Speaker of Parliament, it has to be defended by the Attorney-General, except where there is a conflict situation between them and the Attorney-General, in which case they can defend the action by themselves.
  2. Where an action is brought against the Attorney-General for acts done on behalf of the State, an application can be brought by any person for leave to be able to protect his or her interest.
  3. Where a Judicial Officer is sued in the performance of his official duties, he has a choice to be represented by the Attorney-General or by a counsel of his own preference.
  4. Constitutionally-established independent bodies like the CHRAJ,[xxx] the EC[xxxi] and the NMC[xxxii] can sue and be sued on their own relating to their functions by a lawyer of their choice.
  5. The Judicial Council and for that matter other advisory agencies of Government do not have locus to litigate in Court, so suits against them ought to be directed at the Attorney General.


The issues arising now are:

  1. If it is the Attorney-General who has to be sued for official acts of the Chief Justice, except in conflict situations; why does the Supreme Court continue to entertain suits brought against the Chief Justice as evidenced in the recent cases of Fred Kwasi Awuah v. The Hon. Chief Justice & Hon. Attorney-General[xxxiii] and Justice Edward Boateng v. The Judicial Secretary?[xxxiv] (It must be noted that in both cases, there was no conflict situation between the Chief Justices and the Attorney General, but the Court did not question or strike out the Chief Justice’s name).
  2. If the argument is pressed further that the capacity of the Chief Justice was not raised by the parties, the question is; is capacity not a legal issue that could be taken by the Court suo motu at any stage? (In both the Delta Foods & Ampratwum cases supra, the case had travelled all the way to the Supreme Court before the respondents were non-suited as not being the proper persons to be sued).
  3. If acts of the Chief Justice in the performance of his/her functions are deemed to be acts of the State for which reason the Attorney-General is to be sued, why does the Supreme Court entertain suits against the Judicial Secretary who only acts on the instructions of the Chief Justice? For if the principal cannot be sued, is it right to sue his/her agent?
  4. If the Attorney-General is the one to be sued to defend the Chief Justice in the performance of his/her duties and the functions of a court Registrar or Judicial Officer falls within the ambit of Article 88 (5); What is the justification for the decision in the Enyerem v. Logistics supra to the effect that when the latter is sued in the performance of his/her Judicial functions, he has the choice to be represented by the Attorney-General or his/her own lawyer, when under article 88 (5), the Attorney-General is rather to be the Defendant to the suit and not the legal representation?
  5. If the Supreme Court is of the view that the Judicial Council under the Constitution has not been given capacity to litigate in Court, the question is: Which of the constitutionally created bodies has expressly been clothed with capacity to litigate and what is the basis under the Constitution for allowing the Electoral Commission, the Media Commission among others to defend their own cases?
  6. In the case of His Lordship Justice Paul Dery & His Lord Lordship Gilbert Ayisi Addo v. Judicial Council and two Others,[xxxv] both the Judicial Council & the Chief Justice were sued and the Court dealt with the merits of the case. The question is; if the Judicial Council lacked capacity to litigate, why did the Apex Court recognize the Council’s capacity when it is the duty of the court to ensure that the proper parties are before it? 
  7. In the Amegatcher’s case, the Supreme Court did not refer to any provision of the Constitution which enables CHRAJ, the E.C and the NMC to sue. What the Court did was to rely on precedents to clothe these institutions with capacity to litigate. Date Bah JSC put it thus: “… [T] here are judicial precedents showing that the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, the Electoral Commission and the National Media Commission may be sued in their own name and not through the Attorney-General. This practice is endorsed and affirmed as being in consonance with the position taken by this Court today”.  
    For consistency sake, I thought that relying on precedent should have guided the Supreme Court in the case of Benjamin Yaw Osei v. Chief Justice & Others supra to clothe the Judicial Council with capacity because it had been successfully sued in the past without any difficulty.
  8. What does ‘State’ connote under Article 88 (5) of the Constitution, 1992 so that we can easily delimit the scope? Neither the Constitution nor the Interpretation Act[xxxvi] define it. In the Enyerem case, the Supreme Court had a fine opportunity to address the thorny issue, but their Lordships seemed disinterested in pursuing the venture. For instance, should acts of a head teacher of a Government primary school or even a driver of the school in the course of performing his functions be deemed acts of the State warranting the Attorney-General to be made defendant because the Ghana Education Service for which they are members and work for is a statutory creation?[xxxvii] Or should we confine the meaning of ‘State’ to only acts of the Executive or the three arms of Government or their Heads? 
  9. On the decision that the Chief Justice can apply to join a suit to protect his/her interest, the question is; if his/her actions are deemed to be done in his/her official capacity and not private capacity, what personal interest of his/hers would he/she be seeking to protect?
  10. Alternatively, if the issue concerned is her personal matter, why should it be situated in the context of article 88 (5) as proceedings against the State for the Attorney General to defend in the first place?
  11. In the Amegatcher case supra, the Supreme Court through Date Bah JSC set this guideline: “Furthermore, applications may be made in respect of other State organs to this Court[xxxviii] in relation to specific cases for leave of these organs to be allowed to sue or be sued in their own name, in order to avoid conflict of interest” [Emphasis is mine]. 

The policy reasoning for these State organs to first apply for leave from the Supreme Court to be able to sue and be sued is not easily conjectured. I thought the High Court or the trial Court should have been the forum to apply for the leave to sue or defend. Under Order 4 Rule 5 (2) of the High Court Civil Procedure Rules, 2004 (C.I. 47), the decision to join or disjoin a party is for the Court to take and the Court as defined under Order 82 Rule 3 of C.I. 47 means the High Court and the Circuit Court in civil cases.


The task of constitutional interpretation is indeed an onerous one not reserved for minnows. For this reason, the Supreme Court should be commended for their effort so far. Reading their Lordships’ transcendent judgments is always a delight. The exposition of their wisdom entailed with their legal ability and sheer mental power act like a quarry, able to grind to fine sand the biggest and hardest rocks of legal problems. But as His Lordship Atuguba JSC (As he then was) once said: ‘even generals have batmen’[xxxix]. Therefore, with much diffidence I venture, though unworthy, to suggest that their Lordships should do a little more to bring some clarity and consistency in the application of Article 88 of the Constitution the next time the opportunity knocks at their door.


My profound gratitude goes to the following for their great invaluable contributions and suggestions to enable this edition see the light of day:

  • His Lordship Justice Victor D. Ofoe, my inspirational mentor who instilled in me the zeal and joy in writing;
  • His Lordship Justice Eric Kyei Baffour, my good brother whose immense support to my career on the Bench has never been lacking;
  • Her Ladyship Justice Janapare A. Batels-Kodwo, a hardworking partner whose excellent proof-reading of this article has added great quality to it; 
  • His Lordship Francis A. Achibonga, my colleague and good friend with whom I share my thoughts on daily basis and benefit from your superior wisdom.

[i] King Rex’s story  titled ‘Eight ways to fail to make law’ can be found online

[ii] Crown immunity has now crystalized into sovereign immunity

[iii] See Robinson’s Public Authorities and Legal Liability, p.6

[iv] (1864) 10 L.T. 762

[v][v] The Latin phrase ‘fiat justitia’ was normally translated ‘Let right be done’. The phrase was first used in the case of Sommerset v. Stewart [1772] 98 ER 499 (Also known as Somersett’s Case) when Lord Mansfield held that chattel slavery was unsupported by the common law in England and Wales.

[vi] See the case of Raleigh v. Goschen [1898] LR 1 CH. 23

[vii] By virtue of the Statutes of General Application

[viii] (No. 12 of 1877)

[ix] The Crown Proceedings Act received Royal Assent on 31 July 1947, but it did not come into force until 1 February 1948

[x] Civil Motion No. JS/24/2012, dated 24 January 2013, S.C (Unreported) available online

[xi] See section 3 (1) (a) of Act 51 which was repealed by the Constitution (Consequential & Transitional Provisions) Decree, 1969 (N.L.C.D. 406), Para 69 because article 170 of the Constitution, 1969 had re-enacted similar provisions.

[xii] See section 2 (1) of the Act.

[xiii] (1973) 2 GLR 304 at p.311 

[xiv] On how Act 51 was applied, see the case of Asiedu-Addo v. Comptroller of Customs & Excise [1981] GLR 505, Per Cecilia Koranteng-Addow J. at pages 509 & 511.

[xv] Act 555

[xvi] Steven Pinker is a Canadian-American Harvard Professor known for his numerous writings about language, mind and human nature 

[xvii] [1999-2000] 1 GLR 225

[xviii] [2009] SCGLR 692 at P.699-700

[xix] Suit No. E. 3/9/2004, dated 21 June 2004

[xx] Civil Appeal No. J4/21/2006 (Unreported)

[xxi] [2001-2002] 1 GLR 186

[xxii] [2012] 1 SCGLR 679

[xxiii] (16/1/2015) [2016] GHASC 25 (05 December 2016).

[xxiv] See footnote 23

[xxv] (No. J6/3/2017) GHASC (28 February 2018)

[xxvi] See section 3 of the Judicial Service (Amendment) Act, 1965 (Act 281).

[xxvii] Civil Appeal No. J4/47/2019, dated 4 December 2019 

[xxviii] [2001-2002] SCGLR 437

[xxix] [2012] SCGLR 679

[xxx] CHRAJ is the acronym for the Commission of Human Rights and Administrative Justice.

[xxxi] EC is the acronym for the Electoral Commission.

[xxxii] NMC is the acronym for the National Media Commission.

[xxxiii] Writ No. J1/9/2018, dated 19 December 2019, S.C. (Unreported)

[xxxiv] See Footnote 25.

[xxxv] Suit No: J1/8/2016 [2016] GHASC 90 (26 May 2016)

[xxxvi] Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792)

[xxxvii] See section 2 (b) of the Ghana Education Act, 1995 (Act 506)

[xxxviii] This Court referring to the Supreme Court

[xxxix] See the opening paragraph of his Lordship Atuguba’s concurring opinion in the Amegatcher case.

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The author is a Justice of the High Court of Ghana and is currently on secondment in the Gambia. He obtained his LLB at the University of Ghana in 2000 and was called to the bar in 2002. In 2010, he joined the bench as a circuit court judge – after 8 years in private practice. He became a High Court Judge in 2013. Justice Alexander Osei Tutu holds an LLM in International Human Rights from the Fordham University and a Diploma in Transnational Criminal Law from the International Law Enforcement Academy at Roswell, USA.

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