As transaction lawyers representing clients with businesses in regulated spaces, we often find ourselves engaging regulators to seek their consent, approval or some other kind of authorisation that is required to enable our clients conduct their business transactions lawfully. For instance, as part of its measures to ensure compliance with regular prudential requirements amid the global COVID-19 pandemic, the Bank of Ghana has recently announced that all banks and specialised deposit-taking institutions must seek its prior written approval before declaring and paying dividends to shareholders. Dealings with regulators should, ordinarily, be simple; the law requires a regulated entity to seek regulatory authorisation for a prescribed conduct so the regulated entity (with the help of its lawyers) applies for the authorisation, satisfies the regulator that it has complied with all the legal requirements for the grant of the authorisation, and bingo! Approval is granted. The law sometimes even prescribes turnaround times for the conclusion of these transactions. Sounds pretty quick and simple, right? At least, it does in theory. The practice of it, however, often proves to be a different kettle of fish. Regulators are usually public corporations, often established by statute, governed by boards whose members are appointed by the President and staffed by public sector workers. Many times, the poor turnaround time for transacting business with such public entities is blamed on the work culture of its non-management employees.
In my experience, this is not always the case. Doing business with regulators can be painfully slow, especially towards the end of an election year and (in the event of a change in government) during a newly-elected government’s first year in office. This phenomenon occurs because the Presidential (Transition) Act, 2012 (Act 843) (the Presidential Transition Act) automatically terminates the appointment of persons who are appointed by a (former) President to statutory boards and corporations after the assumption of office of a newly-elected President. Bearing this in mind, the governing boards of regulatory authorities (that are statutory corporations) start preparing for their exit as elections approach, which tends to impact their regulatory activities negatively.
Further, because the governing bodies of these bodies are usually dissolved automatically by a change in government, certain functions concerned with regulatory oversight are often brought to a standstill until the governing bodies are reconstituted. For instance, following the swearing-in of the President on 7 January 2017, the governing board of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) remained dissolved until 9 months later, when a new board was reconstituted. After the new SEC board was commissioned, its chairman stated that “…the board will be concerned about covering up on the backlog of initiatives which were unable to be executed due to the non-existence of the board.” It is for these reasons that the decision of the Supreme Court in the recent case of Theophilus Donkor v. Attorney-General (the Theophilus Donkor Case) is of particular interest to us.
The issue before the court in the Theophilus Donkor Case related to the constitutionality of section 14(1) and paragraph 6 of the schedule to the Presidential Transition Act, which terminate the appointments of “persons who are appointed by the President or a minister of state as members of statutory boards and corporations” after a change in government. The plaintiff’s contention was that the impugned provisions of the Presidential Transition Act were inconsistent with article 191(b) of the Constitution, which, among others, prohibits the dismissal or removal from office of a member of the public services without just cause. Among others, the plaintiff argued that a change in government does not qualify as just cause and therefore the impugned provisions were unconstitutional. In a unanimous judgment, the Supreme Court held that “…members of the governing bodies of statutory boards, corporations, authorities (howsoever described) are not members of the public services, and not public officers by virtue of their membership of the governing body of a statutory board or corporation. They are therefore not governed by article 191(b) of the Constitution.” This means that the President does not require just cause to remove members of the governing body of a statutory board or corporation from office and that such persons may lawfully be removed from office at any time, including pursuant to the Presidential Transition Act.
The Supreme Court, however, held that chief executive officers, directors-general and other executive heads of statutory corporations are members of the public services who hold office subject to the provisions of the relevant constitutive enactment and their letters of appointment and therefore the Presidential Transition Act is unconstitutional to the extent that it requires the holders of such positions to cease to hold office after a change in government occurs. The Supreme Court also held that representatives of constituent bodies and interest groups on the governing boards of statutory corporations can only be removed by the interests they represent and in accordance with the tenure and removal provisions of the relevant constitutive enactment (not by the President or pursuant to the Presidential Transition Act). I disagree (respectfully) with the reasoning and conclusions of the learned Justices of the Supreme Court, and in the paragraphs that follow, I will review relevant portions of the judgment, demonstrate why I think the court erred and propose the approach the Supreme Court should have adopted to resolve the vexed issues.
Governing Bodies of Statutory Corporations and the Public Officers Question
To determine whether article 191(b) of the Constitution applies to members of the governing bodies of statutory corporations, the Supreme Court found it necessary to question whether such persons are public officers and/or members of the public services, as defined under the Constitution. It is respectfully submitted that this question was not necessary to resolve the real issue in contention before the court. The reason for this submission, as demonstrated below, is that the Supreme Court has on previous occasions asked and answered this question. However, to the extent that their Lordships considered it necessary to consider this question, it is my respectful submission that the Supreme Court was bound by its own previous decisions to answer this question in the affirmative (the Supreme Court is ordinarily bound by its own decisions). Further, the Supreme Court’s decision is inconsistent with clear and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution.
Relevant principles for Constitutional Interpretation
It is trite learning that the purposive approach is the apposite approach for the interpretation of the Constitution. In Republic v. High Court (Fast Track Division); Ex Parte CHRAJ (Richard Anane Interested Party), Wood CJ (as she was then) explained the purposive approach thus:
“In any constitutional interpretative dispute involving the use of ordinary words or expressions, where no technical words or expressions of art have been employed, and where the Constitution is completely silent on the meaning to be assigned to those words or expressions, the first rule that should be invoked is the ordinary or plain meaning rule. Legitimate questions must necessarily follow its application, including the following: does it advance or defeat the purpose of the legislation or does it lead to a result at variance with the main purpose of the provision, or some unjust, scandalous, incongruous, absurd, strange or extraordinary result…if the interpretation substantially advances the legislative purpose, the matter ought to end there.”
The above quote is authority for the proposition that when determining the scope and effect of words used in the Constitution, recourse must first be had to the definition of the words, as provided by the Constitution. Further, the Constitution must be read as a whole to ensure that all its provisions work together as parts of a functioning whole and all the parts must fit together logically to form a rational, internally consistent framework. Accordingly, a construction which leads to absurdity should be avoided and when a particular interpretation leads to two inconsistent results, the spirit of the Constitution demands that the more reasonable construction which avoids the absurdity should prevail. Indeed, the purposive approach requires that constitutional interpretation should never be oblivious to the destructive results or implications of a particular interpretation, when an alternative interpretation is available that could avert the identified mischief.
The Relevant Constitutional Provisions
Article 288 of the Constitution defines ‘public officer’, for the purposes of Chapter 24 (Code of Conduct for Public Officers) of the Constitution, as a person who holds public office. There is no general definition of public officer in respect of its use in other parts of the Constitution. However, the Supreme Court has had the opportunity to interpret ‘public officer’ (as it appears generally in the Constitution) on, at least, 3 occasions. On all 3 occasions, the Supreme Court has consistently held that persons are public officers if they hold public offices, as defined by the Constitution. Article 295(1) of the Constitution defines ‘public office’ to include “…an office the emoluments attached to which are paid directly from the Consolidated Fund or directly out of moneys provided by Parliament and an office in a public corporation established entirely out of public funds or moneys provided by Parliament.” Article 295(1) of the Constitution defines ‘public corporation’ as “a corporation or any body of persons established by an Act of Parliament or set up out of funds provided by Parliament or other public funds”. Article 295(1) of the Constitution also defines as ‘public service’ as including “service in any civil office of Government, the emoluments attached to which are paid directly from the Consolidated Fund or directly out of moneys provided by Parliament and service with a public corporation”. The definitions indicate that a public office may either be created by the Constitution or a statute.
This is confirmed by article 190 of the Constitution which provides that the public services of Ghana include public services established by the Constitution, public corporations established as non-commercial ventures and other public services as Parliament may by law prescribe. The Constitution provides for the creation of public offices and the appointment of public officers to those offices in several provisions, particularly under articles 70, 71, 190, 192 and 195. Article 70(1) of the Constitution enables the President (acting in consultation with the Council of State) to appoint persons to certain offices, including the chairmen and other members of the governing bodies of public corporations and holders of such other offices as may be prescribed by the Constitution or any other law which is not inconsistent with the Constitution.
Article 71 of the Constitution provides that the emoluments payable to persons appointed by the President under article 70 of the Constitution shall be charged on the Consolidated Fund. Articles 70 and 71 create offices which qualify as public offices under article 295(1) of the Constitution. Accordingly, these offices are public offices, the holders of these offices, who are all appointed by the President in consultation with the Council of State, are public officers and their service with these public corporations makes them members of the public service. Indeed, this was the reasoning adopted by Supreme Court where, by a majority decision, it held that the Auditor-General, who is also appointed by the President under article 70 of the Constitution, is a public officer and a public servant.
The Supreme Court has also affirmed that an entity which is listed under article 190(1) of the Constitution is a member of the public service and its officers are public servants and public officers. Article 190(1)(d) indicates that public corporations which are not set up as commercial ventures form part of the public services of Ghana. Accordingly, officers of such non-commercial statutory corporations are also public servants and public officers.
Considering the above constitutional provisions and case law, it is odd that the Supreme Court chose to consider whether members of the governing boards of statutory corporations are public officers, and further, concluded that members of these governing bodies (except chief executive officers) are neither public officers nor public servants. The Constitution requires the Supreme Court to treat its own previous decisions as normally binding, and to depart from these decisions only where it appears right for it to do so. The judgment of the Supreme Court does not indicate that the Honourable Court considered any of the relevant case law (such as the P.C Appiah Ofori Case, where it was held that persons appointed under article 70 of the Constitution are public officers for the purposes of article 190 and Chapter 14 of the Constitution (subject to the exception in relation to public corporations established as commercial ventures) for the purposes of making a distinction.
Further, when the Constitution is read as a whole, the court’s narrow interpretation of public officers creates disharmony in the interpretation of other provisions of the Constitution, resulting in manifest inconsistencies that prevent all the parts of the Constitution from fitting together logically to form a rational, internally consistent framework. For instance, article 285 of the Constitution (under Chapter 24 (Code of Conduct for Public Officers)) prohibits a person from being appointed as the chairperson of the governing body of a public corporation while she holds a service position in that corporation.
The framers of the Constitution would not have included such a provision under Chapter 24 of the Constitution if they did not consider the chairpersons of public corporations as public officers. Article 286(5)(i) of the Constitution explicitly lists chairpersons of public corporations among the “…public offices to which the provisions of this article apply…” It is impossible to understand how members of the governing bodies of statutory corporations and/or authorities are neither public officers nor members of the public services when the Constitution itself refers to them as public officers in other provisions. Indeed, the fact that members of the governing bodies of statutory corporations are public officers is acknowledged by the express wording of section 14(3) of the Presidential Transition Act, which essentially implies that the enactment only applies to the “public officers” whose offices are named in the schedule. The inclusion of the members of the governing bodies of statutory corporations in the relevant schedule of the Presidential Transition Act, therefore, indicates that these persons are public officers and public servants.
Finally, public corporations are created by enactment, pursuant to article 192(1)(b) and 192(1)(d), which fall under Chapter 14 (The Public Services) of the Constitution. To the extent that statutory corporations which are not set up as commercial ventures are within the Public Services of Ghana under article 190(1)(b) of the Constitution, the governing bodies and staff members of such bodies are subject to Chapter 14 of the Constitution, and are public officers and/servants. With all due respect, the learned Justices of the Supreme Court were wrong to hold otherwise.
Constitutionality of the Presidential Transition Act
Members of the Governing Bodies Statutory Corporations
On the basis that members of the governing bodies of statutory corporations are not public officers or in the public service, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional requirement for just cause does not apply to such offices and therefore the relevant provisions of the Presidential Transition Act were not unconstitutional. I disagree, respectfully. The approach adopted by the Supreme Court suggests that a determination that members of the governing bodies of statutory corporations are public officers or members of the public service necessarily means that the provisions of article 191(b) of the Constitution (ie the requirement for just cause) applies to them. Such a position would be incorrect. The Constitution creates several public offices under various provisions and enables Parliament to create additional public offices.
The terms and conditions of service applicable to the staff and governing bodies of each public office are not the same – they depend, firstly, on the provisions of the Constitution itself, and secondly, on the relevant provisions of each relevant constitutive enactment. It is for these reasons that although the Auditor-General and the chairmen and other members of the governing body of the Public Services Commission are appointed under article 70 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has (in the P.C Appiah Ofori Case) held that the Auditor-General is caught by the provisions of article 199 of the Constitution and therefore is required to retire at the age of 60, while the chairmen and other members of the governing body of the Public Services Commission are excluded from the general scope of article 199 of the Constitution because the Constitution has expressly pegged the terms and conditions of their service to the terms and conditions of service of Justices of the Court of Appeal (who are required to retire at age 70).
Ministers of State and their deputies are public servants by virtue of the nature of their offices, and yet the terms and conditions of their appointment are subject mainly to the provisions of articles 78, 79, 80 and 94 of the Constitution (not Chapter 14 of the Constitution) and just cause is not required for their dismissal. Judges and members of the judicial service are also public officers, however, the terms and conditions of their appointments are subject mainly to the provisions of Chapter 11 (The Judiciary) of the Constitution. Recourse must therefore be had to all the provisions of the Constitution, on a case by case basis, to determine whether or not any provision under Chapter 14 applies to a specific public officer.
A person may be a public officer and yet, be excluded from the scope of a provision of the Constitution which relates to public officers. The Supreme Court adopted this approach in Yovuyibor and Another v. Attorney- General and Another, where in considering whether article 199 of the Constitution (in relation to retirement at 60 years for public officers) applied to police officers, the Honourable Court reasoned that the framers of the Constitution contemplated 2 types of employees in the public services: those holding appointments for fixed periods (ie fixed term contract employees); and those holding permanent appointments (ie career employees whose appointments are not limited in time and who, by the terms of their employment, can look forward to being employed until they reach the prescribed retiring age, subject to the needs of the public services, their own competence and good behaviour) and held that the retirement age prescribed by article 199 of the Constitution applies only to public officers who hold pensionable employments.
The Road Not Taken
Since the Constitution authorises Parliament to create statutory corporations, provides that these entities are part of the public services and makes general provisions in respect of all public offices, the Supreme Court in determining whether the provisions of the Presidential Transition Act violated the just cause requirement ought to have considered whether on a true and proper interpretation of the Constitution, the just cause requirement applies to the dismissal of members of the governing bodies of statutory corporations. Instead, the Supreme Court compared the provisions of the Presidential Transition Act to the provisions of the constitutive enactments.
In Agyei Twum v Attorney-General the Supreme Court held that the fact that Ghana has a written constitution does not mean that only its letter might be interpreted and that the courts have a responsibility to distil the spirit of the Constitution from, among others, its underlying philosophy, core values, basic structure, the history and nature of the country’s legal and political systems in order to determine what implied provisions in the written constitution would flow from that spirit. It is respectfully submitted that if the Supreme Court had adopted these principles in determining whether the just cause requirement applies to the dismissal of members of the governing bodies of statutory corporations, it would have reached a different conclusion.
Indeed, it is quite evident that the court considered matters such as political reality in relation to the governance of public services in the part of its judgment in relation to “constitutional governing bodies” from its observations concerning how important it is for the work and functioning of these bodies to not become unduly paralysed following the assumption of office of a new President and that “the situation where such bodies are incapacitated, sometimes for upwards of six months, following the assumption of office of a new President is not mandated by the Constitution and Act 845, and should not continue”.
It was partly for these reasons that the court held that although the rationale for the enactment of the Presidential Transition Act is to ensure that a new President is not saddled with the non-career appointees of a previous President, the preferable course of action will be for a new President to make her appointments to these offices, as soon as possible after assumption of office. Although the Supreme Court’s consideration of the effect of the Presidential Transition Act on the offices of members of the governing bodies of public services created by the Constitution was not necessary for the simple reason that the Presidential Transition Act expressly refers only to statutory boards and corporations (which are bodies created by statute and not the Constitution), it is respectfully submitted that the Supreme Court should have applied similar principles to the actual question before it to strike down the relevant provisions of the Presidential Transition Act for being unconstitutional.
With respect, I think the Supreme Court missed a great opportunity to ensure that the business of regulators and regulated entities is not unnecessarily yoked to and disrupted by the country’s political cycle. A statutory corporation is a corporate person with its own distinct legal personality. The purpose of its separation from normal government operations includes ensuring that, at least in theory, statutory corporations operate independently, with little political interference.
Although in practice, political interference is unavoidable because the members of the governing boards of such entities are appointed by the President and they are usually subject to policy direction from sector ministers, it is the duty of the Supreme Court to, through its constitutional interpretation function, find creative ways of developing the constitutional protection afforded to such entities to ensure business continuity and sound corporate governance principles in public administration. The framers of the Constitution, recognising the massive restructuring that public service was undergoing (at that time) and the proliferation of appointing authorities in the public services, proposed that the overriding criteria for all changes should be to ensure viable, efficient and productive public administration and posited that these overriding criteria will be achieved by engendering stability in public administration through, among others, requiring just cause for the dismissal of members of the public services.
The framers of the Constitution were emphatic that their “recommendations in respect of security of tenure and the requirement of due process in the removal of public officers must necessarily apply to all categories of the public services.” In today’s fast-paced economy, the governing boards of statutory corporations are key players in the regulation and facilitation of business in important sectors of the economy and the impugned provisions of the Presidential Transition Act not only interfere with the stability that these governing boards require to carry out their functions effectively, but make nonsense of the political insulation that incorporation affords statutory corporations (through among others, the tenure provisions and the terms of office provided under the Constitution and the relevant constitutive enactments). Enforcing the constitutionally sanctioned protection given to these public officers would, at least, compel politicians to give governing boards of statutory corporations the opportunity to carry out their mandate for their respective terms and dismiss them in accordance with the provisions of their constitutive enactments and/or the terms of their appointment letters.
In the absence of legal cause for dismissal (in the constitutive enactment or letter of appointment), whether or not a member of the governing board of a statutory corporation who was appointed by a previous administration continues to work under a new government would be a subject for backdoor discussions between both parties (which is the practical approach). In all of these scenarios, the incidence of statutory corporations operating without governing boards would be greatly reduced. It is for these reasons that I respectfully submit that the Supreme Court erred when it held that the impugned provisions of the Presidential Transition Act were not unconstitutional.
It is further submitted that members of the governing bodies of statutory boards and corporations hold their offices subject to the provisions of the Constitution (including the requirement for just cause to dismiss), the relevant constitutive enactments and their appointment letters.
Accordingly, what constitutes just cause must be determined by reference to the provisions of these same sources. For instance, the Securities Industry Act, 2016 (Act 929) (the SEC Act) provides that the President may revoke the appointment of any member of the SEC board (except the Director-General and his 2 deputies) by a letter addressed to that member (without any reason or just cause requirement). With respect to the Director-General and his 2 deputies, the SEC Act provides that they shall hold office on the terms and conditions specified in their appointment letters.Similarly, the appointment of a member of the governing board (except the chief executive officer) of the National Pensions Regulatory Authority may be revoked by the President by a letter addressed to that person (without any reason or just cause requirement) while its chief executive officer holds office subject to the terms and conditions of this appointment letter. The same principles apply to the dismissal of members of the governing board of the Petroleum Commission and the National Insurance Commission.
In contrast, the members of the governing board of the Energy Commission may only be removed from office by the President for inability to perform the functions of their office, stated misbehaviour or any other just cause while the chief executive officer holds office subject to the terms and conditions of this appointment letter. The same principles apply to the dismissal of members of the governing board of GETFund, the Minerals Commission and the National Petroleum Authority (where dismissal requires just cause and consultation with the relevant nominating body). The President must therefore exercise his powers to appoint, discipline and revoke the appointment of the relevant public officers under article 297(a) of the Constitution in accordance with the dictates of the Constitution and the relevant constitutive enactments.
Other Conclusions of the Court
Chief Executive Officers, Directors-General and other Executive Heads of Statutory Corporations
The Supreme Court held that the impugned provisions of the Presidential Transition Act only apply to the members of the governing bodies of the statutory corporations, not their chief executive officers, directors-general or other executive heads. To arrive at this conclusion, the Supreme Court sought to distinguish between executive heads and the other members of the governing bodies of public corporations by stating that executive heads are public officers and members of the public service because they are appointed pursuant to article 195 of the Constitution, while the other members of the governing boards are not public officers or public servants because they are mostly appointed by the President pursuant to article 70 of the Constitution. With the greatest of respect to the learned Justices of the Supreme Court, there is no constitutional justification for a distinction between persons appointed pursuant to article 195 of the Constitution and persons appointed pursuant to article 70 of the Constitution for the purposes of determining whether a person is a public officer or a public servant. As has already been discussed above, there is judicial precedent from the Supreme Court itself that persons appointed to public offices pursuant to article 70 of the Constitution are public officers and public servants.
Representative Interests on Governing Boards of Statutory Corporations
The Supreme Court held that the impugned provisions of the Presidential Transition Act do not affect representatives of constituent bodies and other interest groups on the governing bodies of statutory corporations and that such persons may only be dismissed by the body or interest they represent and in accordance with the tenure and removal provisions of the relevant constitutive enactments. This statement is problematic because although constitutive enactments may authorise certain interest groups to have representatives on the governing board of a statutory corporation, the appointing authority is vested in the President by the Constitution. To hold that it is these interest groups, and not the President, who are mandated to remove their representatives from the governing board of a statutory corporation is therefore unconstitutional. Such a holding also contravenes the removal provisions of most constitutive enactments, which simply authorise the President to revoke a person’s appointment or, at best, require the President to remove a representative in consultation with the relevant nominating authority.
Dissolution of Boards
The Supreme Court held that the impugned provisions of the Presidential Transition Act do not have the effect of automatically dissolving the governing boards of statutory corporations. This holding is inconsistent with the practice ever since the enactment of the Presidential Transition Act, pursuant to which the entire governing boards of statutory corporations are reconstituted after a new government assumes office. Perhaps the fact that the Presidential Transition Act does not operate to automatically dissolve the governing board of a statutory corporation is its entirety will be more apparent henceforth, with the Supreme Court’s decision that the assumption of office of a new government does not affect the appointment of chief executive officers (executive secretaries, directors-general and other executive heads) of statutory corporations and the representative interests on the governing board. Although this pronouncement is welcome and will help to ensure some stability in public administration, it is respectfully submitted that the legal principles that lead us to this conclusion are unconstitutional.
Staff of Public Corporations
The Supreme Court held that the impugned provisions of the Presidential Transition Act only apply to the members of the governing bodies of the statutory corporations, not their permanent staff. To arrive at this conclusion, the Supreme Court sought to distinguish between the staff and the members of the governing bodies of public corporations by referring to the fact that the overwhelming majority of staff of public corporations are public officers and members of the public service because they are appointed pursuant to article 195 of the Constitution, as opposed to the members of the governing boards, who are mostly appointed by the President pursuant to article 70 of the Constitution. It is respectfully submitted that this discussion and conclusion were not necessary for the resolution of the vexed issue because the impugned provisions of the Presidential Transition Act specifically relate to the members of the governing bodies of statutory corporations, and not to their staff.
The Supreme Court held that the impugned provisions of the Presidential Transition Act do not apply to the governing boards and chief executive officers of state companies (ie companies incorporated under the Companies Act, 2019 (Act 992) and in which the government of Ghana hold shares). It is respectfully submitted that this discussion and conclusion was not required for the resolution of the vexed issue before the court because the Presidential Transition Act expressly relates to statutory corporations, which cannot by any means include companies incorporated pursuant to the Companies Act, 2019 (Act 992). Indeed, the court acknowledged this in its judgment but of course, this invites the obvious question of the rationale behind the inclusion of this discussion and conclusion in the judgment in the first place.
The upshot of this judgment is that the Supreme Court declared the impugned provisions of the Presidential Transition Act as unconstitutional only to the extent that they require the executive heads of statutory corporations and representative interests on the governing boards of statutory corporations to be dismissed on the assumption of office of a newly elected President. This outcome is no doubt a positive step for public administration. However, the legal principles which underpin this decision and the path adopted by the Supreme Court to arrive at it raises more questions. If the Supreme Court had traversed the road not taken, it would have followed hallowed constitutional principles and precedent, while engendering stability and political independence in public administration, contributing to a more efficient, viable and productive public sector regulators.
 Unreported; Writ No. J1/08/2017; 12 June 2019.
 Please see footnote 8.
 [2007-2008] SCGLR 213.
 Ransford France (No.3) v Attorney-General & Electoral Commission  1 SCGLR 705.
 National Media Commission v Attorney-General [1999-2000] 2 GLR 577 SC).
 See Agbevor v Attorney-General  SCGLR 403; Appiah Ofori v. Attorney General  SCGLR 484; and Justice Paul Uuter Dery v. The Judicial Council & 2 Others (Unreported; Writ No J1/8/2016; May 26, 2016).
 Appiah Ofori v Attorney-General (supra).
 Justice Paul Uuter Dery & Another v. The Judicial Council & 2 Others (Supra).
 [1993-94] 2 GLR 343.
 [2005-2006] SCGLR 732.
 Report of the Committee of Experts (Constitution) on Proposals for a Draft Constitution of Ghana, 31 July 1991, page 168.
 Ibid., paragraph 368.
 SEC Act, section 5.
 Ibid., sections 11(2) and 12(2).
 National Pensions Act, 2008 (Act 766), sections 9(5) and 16(2).
 Petroleum Commission Act, 2011 (Act 821), sections 5(5) and 11(2).
 Insurance Act, 2006 (Act 724) section 5(5).
 Energy Commission Act, 1997 (Act 541), sections 5(5) and 45(2).
 Ghana Education Trust Fund Act, 2000 (Act 581), sections 14(5) and 15(2).
 Minerals Commission Act, 1993 (Act 450), sections 8 and 11(3).
 National Petroleum Authority Act, 2005 (Act 691), sections 5(5) and 48(2).
 See footnote 23, supra.