Proprietary Estoppel and Adverse Possession: A Struggle Between Fairness and Legalised Theft
Abstract
The doctrine of proprietary estoppel is based on reliance by the claimant on representations or encouragement from the legal owner of the land. It serves as a shield for the claimant because of these representations or assurances. In such cases, the legal owner may lose their interest in the land if it is well established that the claimant has expended substantial resources on the land. In Re Basham (dec’d), Mr. Edward Nuhee Q.C. (sitting as a High Court judge) set out the principle of proprietary estoppel in its broadest form in the following terms:
“Where one person, A, has acted to his detriment on the faith of a belief, which was known to and encouraged by another person, B, that he either has or is going to be given a right in or over B’s property, B cannot insist on his strictly legal rights if to do so would be inconsistent with A’s belief.”[1]
The above-cited passage was accepted by the Court of Appeal in Wayling v. Jones[2] as an accurate statement of the general principle, the basis of which is to prevent a legal owner from insisting on their strict legal rights if it would be unfair to the claimant, who relied on the legal owner’s encouragement.
In contrast, with adverse possession, it generally acts as a sword against the indolent legal owner who fails to actively possess or protect their land. The doctrine of adverse possession effectively transfers land from the owners to non-owners who have entered the land unlawfully. Under this doctrine, except for those with a superior title, the adverse possessor gains full control over the land, whether they are a squatter or a trespasser. In Amidu & Anor v. Alawiye & Anor[3], His Lordship Pwamang JSC opined:
“The defendants in their statement of case submitted that squatters can acquire title to land after 12 years of occupation. That is an erroneous statement of law. The legal definition of a squatter in Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edition, 2004, is ‘a person who settles on property without legal claim or title.’ The distinction in law between a squatter and a trespasser lies in the fact that a trespasser enters onto land and claims an interest that is inconsistent with the rights of the true owner, whereas a squatter does not assert any interest in the land they occupy. Therefore, possession by a squatter does not constitute an adverse claim against the title of the true owner, and thus, a squatter cannot prevail under the defense of limitation.”
His Lordship Pwamang JSC is of the view that squatters cannot rely on adverse possession to claim ownership of land but trespassers who claim an interest in the land can. However, the Limitation Act, as mentioned, makes it possible for all persons who have occupied land continuously for 12 years to invoke the provisions of the Act as a shield, using adverse possession to resist a claim to the land by the true owner. The concept of adverse possession has been brilliantly criticized by His Lordship Justice Osei-Tutu in his recent articles on adverse possession as unjust.
Section 26 of the Evidence Act is akin to proprietary estoppel, while section 10 of the Limitation Act is the provision under which adverse possession derives its authority.
The two doctrines, adverse possession and proprietary estoppel present a double-edged sword in property law. I submit that proprietary estoppel is fairer than adverse possession.
INTRODUCTION
This paper provides a vivid insight into the various doctrines within Ghanaian jurisprudence, highlighting their relevance to land disputes and how their applicability can help shape the legal landscape of land litigation in Ghana. Adverse possession is enshrined in our statutes, while the doctrine of proprietary estoppel derives its foundation from “the interposition of equity,” which aims to “mitigate the rigors of strict law.” However, the author submit that the doctrine of adverse possession serves as a complete sword to the legal owner, potentially resulting in what some consider legalized theft. The author will distinguish between the various doctrines and explore how they can be effectively applied to resolve land disputes.
THE DOCTRINE OF PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL
The recent proprietary estoppel case of Earl of Plymouth v Rees[4] is another classic example of where this doctrine has been used as a “shield” (i.e as a defence to an action) rather as a “sword” (i.e as claim or cause of action). Mark Pawlowski in his book entitled; ‘The Doctrine of Proprietary Estoppel’[5] also argued that proprietary estoppel may be used only as a “shield” in defence of an action by the legal owner but also as “sword” capable of grounding an independent cause of action. In the leading case of Crabb v Arun District Council[6]
“……it is commonly supposed that estoppel is not itself a cause of action. But that is because there are estoppels and estoppels. Some do give rise to a cause of action. Some do not. In the species of estoppel called proprietary estoppel, it does give rise to a cause of action.”
The doctrine of proprietary estoppel can be likened to the case of Central London Property Trust v High Trees House (The High Trees Case)[7], where Lord Denning Stated:
“But what is the position in view of development in the law in recent years? The law has not been standing still since Jordan v Money. There has been a series of decisions over the last fifty years which although they are said to be cases of estoppel are not really such. They are cases in which a promise was made which was intended to create legal relations and which to the knowledge of the person making the promise, was going to be acted on by the person to whom it was made, and which was in fact so acted on. In such a cases, the courts have said that the promise must be honoured.”
The origin of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel dates back to the 17th century, although the early cases do not refer to it as a form of “estoppel” but rather as “raising an equity.” The modern law is often said to stem from the House Lords decision in Ramsden v Dyson[8]. Mark Pawlowski in his book: ‘The Doctrine of Proprietary Estoppel ‘supra stated: “The proprietary estoppel is viewed both as a method of preventing unconscientious dealing in relation to land and as a means of creating informational proprietary interests in land whenever a party has acted to his detriment in reliance upon an oral assurance that he has such an interest.”
A legal owner who permits a licensee to develop his land and expend so much resources cannot be ousted because equity came to mitigate the rigors of the common law. The legal incidents of a licence in land law as explained at p. 161 Chapter 9 of Ghana Land Law and Conveyancing BY B.J. Da ROCHA and C.H.K LODOH, 2NDedition, are as follows:
“A licence is, according to section 139 of the Land Title Registration Law, 1986 (PNDC 152) ‘permission given by a proprietor of land or of an interest in land which allows the licensee to do certain acts in relation to the land which would otherwise be a trespass,” a license creates no proprietary interest in land. In its simplest form, it is revocable at the will of the licensor, but there are some circumstances in which the licensee will be protected against revocation by the licensor. There are three categories of licenses known to the common law, namely; licence coupled with an interest in land, contractual license and a bare licence.”
According to the learned authors, where there is a contractual licence and licence coupled with an interest in land the legal owner cannot oust the licencee from the property. Equity would intervene to prevent the licensor from ousting the licensee. As rightly stated by Pwamang JSC in Apietu Ampofo v Samuel Ankrah & 5 Ors.[9] thus: “Notwithstanding what we have said above concerning the legal rights of licensees and licensors, equity has evolved a different set of approaches to licence where, under certain circumstances, equity considers it unjust to allow a licensor to revoke a licence. In those circumstances equity would intervene. In the case of Crabb v Arun District Council[10], Denning MR said as follows:
“Equity come in, true to form, to mitigate the rigours of strict law. The early cases did not speak of it as “estoppel”. They spoke of it as “raising an equity”. If I may expand that, Lord Cairns said: “It is the first principle upon which all Courts of Equity proceed,” that it will prevent a person from insisting on his strict legal rights-whether arising under a contract, or on his title deeds, or by statute-when it would be inequitable for him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, see Hughes v Metropolitan Railway (1877) 2 AC at page 448.”
With the objective of mitigation of the harshness of the law in relation to licences, equity has developed two main principles discernible from the decided cases, the concept of a licence coupled with an equity, and the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. There are a conflicting views as to whether a contractual licence and proprietary estoppel can overlap. Evershed M.R after referring to a passage in his own judgment in Forster v Robinson[11] observed:
“I did not intend to lay it down in the passage that, where a promise has been made which is not contractual in form or effect and that promise has in fact been acted upon, then and without more a right is given to the promise to go on enjoying the subject-matter of the promise indefinitely.”
Denning L.J (as he then was) expressed a similar opinion in the same case at p. 768 where he said: “To establish a contractual licence there must be a promise which is intended to be binding; and which is either supported by consideration, or is intended to be acted on and is in fact acted on.”
In Tanner v Tanner[12], Lord Denning M.R. described a contractual licence in terms resembling a proprietary estoppel. In this case, the defendant, a spinster gave birth to twin daughters of whom the plaintiff was the father. The plaintiff and defendant subsequently decided that a house should be purchased to provide a home for the defendant and her baby daughters. The plaintiff bought a house on mortgage, and the defendant left her rent-controlled flat and moved with the children into the house. Three years later, the plaintiff offered the defendant 4000pounds to move out of the house. The Court of Appeal held that the inference to be drawn from the circumstances was that the defendant had a contractual licence to have accommodation in the house for herself and the children so long as the children were of school going age and reasonably required the accommodation. It was held that she had provided consideration by giving up of her rent-controlled flat and looking after the children. Since the defendant had moved out, the court awarded her compensation of 2000 pounds for the loss of the licence.
In the case of Greasely v Cooke[13], a housekeeper (and mistress) had looked after a house and family for many years without wages, having been encouraged to believe that she could regard the house as her house for life,. She was held to be entitled to remain in it for as long as she wished without proving that her services were attributable to the assurances given her, once she showed that she in fact relied upon them. Also in Pascoe v Turner[14], the plaintiff after buying a new house left the defendant to stay in his old house creating the impression that the defendant could live there indefinitely. The defendant to the knowledge of the plaintiff expended his own money to repair and make improvements to the house. Later the relationship between them went bad and the plaintiff gave the defendant two months’ notice to vacate the house. When the defendant refused to vacate the plaintiff sued to recover possession, the English Court of Appeal affirmed the finding that the defendant was a licensee but they nevertheless held that she obtained an equity in the house that ought to be satisfied by the court. After considering all the circumstances, they ordered a conveyance to be executed for her protection.
Again, in the Ghanaian case of Quist v George[15], Abban J (as he then was) was faced with facts wherein a licensee was permitted to build and operate a private hospital on land that his mother-in-law conveyed to his wife. The marriage broke down so they separated and the wife re-conveyed the land to her mother who sued the husband, medical doctor, to recover the land together with the hospital. Abban J. sitting in the High Court, after reviewing a series of English authorities relied on the doctrine of proprietary estoppel and held as follows at p. 13:
“The defendant constructed the hospital not only with acquiescence of the daughter but also with the active encouragement of the daughter who, at the material time, was the legal owner of the land; and since he expended a considerable amount of money on the project, equity will neither allow the daughter nor the plaintiff, who is the present legal owner, to rely on her legal title to prevent the defendant from further enjoyment of the fruits of his toil,”
The renowed jurist said further at p. 14 thus:
“As I have already held, the defendant acquired, not only a contractual licence after the construction of the hospital, but also an equity in the land. In the circumstances, the plaintiff is estopped by the said equity from asserting that the defendant is a bare licensee. Consequently, I hold that the claim of the plaintiff is misconceived.”
The doctrine of proprietary estoppel operates against the legal owner after he has represented to the claimant of make use of the property or expended money on a property and the claimant has acted on such belief to his detriment. In such a case, equity will not allow the legal owner to resile from his promise. Section 26 of the Evidence Act,[16] is instructive.
“Except as otherwise provided by law, including a rule of equity, when a party has, by that party’s own statement, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately caused or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon that belief, the truth of the thing shall be conclusively presumed against that party or the successors in interest of that party in proceedings between
(a) that party or the successors in interest of that party, and
(b) the relying person or successors in interest of that person.
The key ingredients required for the doctrine of proprietary estoppel to be operative are reliance, assurance, and the claimant acting to their detriment, which results in a change in the claimant’s position. Unlike adverse possession, where the claimant is not given any assurance or promise but enters the land voluntarily and later benefits from a 12-year limitation period that protects them from eviction by the legal owner, proprietary estoppel allows the claimant to remain on the land because they were given permission and assurance by the legal owner. The claimant then acts upon that assurance, expending money or making other significant investments on the land. As Gray puts it, “the owner of land is effectively restrained from obtaining arbitrary eviction of the estoppel claimant or from otherwise causing him prejudice.”
It is apparent from the proprietary estoppel cases that the courts apply fairness and adopt a very broad discretion in determining the form of relief to be granted to an estoppel claimant. The underlying principle was stated by the Privy in Plimmer v The Mayor, Councillors and Citizens of the City of Wellingnton[17]: “the court must look at the circumstances in each case to decide in what way the equity can be satisfied.” The courts, in formulating the appropriate remedy, seek to do justice to the claimant’s estoppel equity. It has been said[18] that the court “moulds the relief to give effect to the equity.”
The estoppel claimant’s misconduct towards the legal owner may also affect his/her equitable entitlement. The court has power to look at all the circumstances of the case as they exist at the time of the hearing in order to decide whether it is right to all the claimant to seek equitable relief. In the words of Cumming-Bruce LJ in Williams v Staite[19]:
“I do not think that in a proper case the rights in equity of the defendants necessarily crystallise forever at the time when equitable rights come into existence. On the contrary, I take the view…. That the true analysis is that, when the plaintiff comes to court to enforce his legal rights, the defendant is then entitled to submit that in equity the plaintiff should not be allowed to enforce those rights and that the defendant, raising that equity, must then bring into play all the relevant maxims of equity so that the court is entitled then on the facts to look at all the circumstances and decide what order should be made, if any, to satisfy the equity.”
ADVERSE POSSESSION
Adverse possession is the process by which a person can acquire title to someone else’s land by continuously possessing it for a set limitation period, under circumstances where the owner either has, or is deemed to have, the right to recover the land. In general, occupation or use of land that is expressly or impliedly authorized or approved by the true owner cannot amount to adverse possession, as long as the occupant does not challenge the title of the true owner. A person is considered to be in ‘adverse possession’ if they are someone in whose favor the period of limitation can run. It is only someone with a better title than the person in possession who can displace the adverse possessor. This is because possession is often said to be “nine-tenths of the law.[20]
According to Osei-Tutu J.A in his article titled; Adverse Possession; A Modern Outlook, p. 2 the learned judge in his usual erudite write-up stated: “The adverse possession doctrine posits that where a person enters another person’s land, without that other person’s permission and resides therein continually for a period of stipulated by law, they acquire an interest in that land, potent enough to strip the cloak of ownership from the owner and vest it in themselves.”
In Nmai Boi & Ors v Adjetey Adjei[21], the Supreme Court per Adiyinra JSC stated thus: “The rights conferred by section 10 of the limitation Act, can be enjoyed by a person who remains in adverse possession of land over a period of 12 years irrespective of the fact that they entered the land and developed same without a building permit. The title conferred by the limitation Act is prescriptive and is usually conferred on squatters who obviously cannot and would not apply for a building permit as their initial entry on land is by way of trespass. Until by length of time the limitation Act shall have confirmed his title, the squatter may be turned out by legal process.”
Adinyira JSC continued thus: “Adverse possession must be open, visible and unchallenged so that it gives notice to the legal/paper owner that someone is asserting a claim adverse to his.”
Their Lordships in GIHOC Refrigeration & Household n Hanna Assi[22] also held that squatter may eventually acquire an actionable and enforceable interest in land.
This decision is contrary to the recent decision by Pwamang JSC in Amidu & Anor v Alawiye & Anor supra that possession by adverse possession cannot apply to a squatter. In Memuna Amoudy v Antwi[23], the Supreme Court per Atuguba JSC opined: “The plaintiffs, however, are lawfully on the land as licensee of the Republic despite the compulsory acquisition of the land by the Republic. A license is not an adverse interest. See Twifo Oil Plantations Project Ltd v Ayisi[24]. As licensees, they have no estate to transfer to another. In National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth[25], Lord Hodson said:
“Thomas v Sorrel (1963) Vaugh 330, 351 contains the classic definition of a license propounded by Vaughan CJ: ‘A dispensation or license property passeth no interest, nor alters or transfers property in anything, but only makes an action lawful, which without it had been unlawful.”
Again, in Okpey v Okpey[26], the Supreme Court speaking through Baffoe-Bonnie JSC stated what is required by a party who seeks to rely on the statute of limitation as a shield in an action to recover land as:
“In the case Mmra v Donkor[27], this is what the Supreme Court had to say on limitations, laches and acquiescence: “A party who seeks to rely on the statute of limitation as a defence in an action to recover land must prove that he had been in adverse possession of the land subject-matter of the action and that such adverse possession has been continuous for more than twelve to the knowledge of the true owner.”
The doctrine has over the years been used as a shield and a sword. As a shield for the defendant and as sword against the plaintiff. In the case of Jean Hanna Assi v Attorney General[28] it was submitted that “the statute of limitation was a venerable shield that can be used to ward off indolent and piecemeal litigators.” I submit that the doctrine of adverse possession is a complete sword against the plaintiff and leads to injustice and unjust enrichment unlike proprietary estoppel which is fair and act as shield to the claimant. Also in Binga Dugbartey Sarpor v Ekow Bosomprah[29], Kulendi JSC stated: “It is clear that title may be acquired by adverse possession….In my considered view, therefore, possessory title of an adverse possessor can be used as a sword, and not only as a shield.” However, in Awadali IV v Togbe Gbadaw IV[30], Appau JSC held that: “the possessory rights of the stranger (adverse possessor) in the land could not mature into a full title.” While some jurists[31] advocate that acquisition by adverse possession cannot be equated to an indefeasibility of title against the true owner, others are giving it judicial validation by conferring possessory title on the stranger.
The essential concept is that a possession must be wrongful, unlike proprietary estoppel which makes possession lawful because it actually gives the estoppel claimant to possess the land because he acted upon the reliance and assurance of the land owner. In Wilson v Martin’s Executors[32], Ralph Gibson LJ said: “The concept of adverse possession is that a landowner who fails to take legal action to enforce a cause of action to recover possession of land wrongly taken by a trespasser.” In Ramnarace v Lutchman[33], Lord Millet said: ‘Generally speaking, adverse possession is possession which is inconsistent with and in denial of the title of the true owner. Possession is not normally adverse if it is enjoyed by a lawful title or with the consent of the true owner.”
Having examined some judicial decisions on adverse possession, the author submits that the Ramnarance case supra is akin to the doctrine of proprietary estoppel which the claimant get the consent and permission of the legal owner before acting to his detriment. The concept of adverse possession which has been statutorily accepted in our jurisprudence should not be entertained in recent times as it gives squatters the opportunity to take land arbitrary they do not own and which they entered without the permission of the legal owner. Steven Jordan in his book entitled: ‘Adverse possession’[34] described adverse possession as ‘possession as of wrong’. According to the learned author, the distinction drawn by Nourse LJ was between the acquisition of rights by prescription, where the; possession must have been ‘as of right’ and adverse possession, where the possession must have been wrongful.’
While possession under proprietary estoppel is lawful, possession by adverse possession is considered wrongful because the squatter enters the land unlawfully. In my humble view, a squatter should not be able to hide behind the statute of limitations to oust the legal owner from the land. Since equity came to mitigate the rigors of common law, it would be unjust for the paper owner to be ousted from the land simply because they abandoned it for a period of 12 years.
There are situations where the legal owner may have developed the land to a certain extent, which clearly puts the trespasser on notice. It would therefore be unconscionable for the trespasser to claim adverse possession of the land based solely on a statutory limitation. Even though interest acquired by adverse possession is unlawful. I strongly advocate that it should apply only to trespassers, but not to squatters, as distinguished by Pwamang JSC in Amidu & Anor v. Alawiye & Anor supra.
Section 10 of the Limitation Act, NRCD 54, which regulates adverse possession to land claims does not use the word trespasser or squatter. It uses the word ‘person’. The Supreme Court of Ghana in legion of cases have construed ‘person’ as trespasser or squatters when especially a squatter who has no legitimate interest in the land but has been given statutory protection under the Limitation Act. I believe the Supreme Court of Ghana took inspiration from some common law definition to come to their conclusions that squatters can gain possession by adverse possession. In Trelor v Nute[35], which was applied by Atuguba JSC in the Ghanaian case of Djin v Musa Baako[36] Sir John Pennyuick said: “The law, as we understand it…is that if a squatter takes possession of land belonging to another and remains in possession for twelve years to the exclusion of the owner, that represents adverse possession and accordingly at the end of the twelve years the title of the owner is extinguished.” However in Powell v McFarlene[37], Slade J stated what he described as a ‘few basic principles relating to the concept of possession under English law. The first was as follows:
“In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the owner of land with paper title is deemed to be in possession of the land, as being the person with the prima facie right to possession. The law will thus, without reluctance, ascribe possession either to the paper owner or to person who can establish a title as claiming through the paper owner.”
This principle means that a person can sometimes be treated as being ‘in possession’ as a matter of law, in circumstances where, in fact, he is making no use of the land and asserting no control over it. Therefore, it will be erroneous for the courts in Ghana to still decree title in a squatter or trespasser simply because the paper owner has abandoned the land for more than (12) twelve years.
Section 10(6) of the Limitation Act provides that upon the expiration of the twelve-year period, the true owner loses their right to bring an action to recover the land, and their title to the land is extinguished. Section 10(3) further provides that if there is a temporary abandonment of the adverse possession of land by the squatter, the land ceases to be in adverse possession, and the legal owner is considered to be in possession. The question arises: how do we determine ‘temporary abandonment’ in Section 10(3)? Is it a year, a month, or a week?
Section 10(6) also stipulates that after twelve years, the legal owner’s title is extinguished. This is contrary to the principle established in the Powell case supra, as the legal owner may possess a land title certificate that is indefeasible, unless proven otherwise. Ousting a legal owner with an indefeasible title simply because of a statutory period is unconscionable and should not be countenanced.
The doctrine of adverse possession can be seen as legalized theft, in the sense that the owner did not acquiesce to the squatter or trespasser. Therefore, the squatter should not be able to claim possession based solely on the statute of limitations. The question remains: how can someone guilty of unlawful entry later oust a person with an indefeasible title to land? It has been held that a trespasser does not acquire possession until there has been some form of acquiescence by the true owner to the physical fact of their occupation. In McPhail v Persons Unknown[38], Lord Denning M.R said:
“Now I would say this at once about squatters. The owner is not obliged to go to the courts to obtain possession. He is entitled, if he so desires, to take the remedy into his own hands. He can go himself and turn them out without the aid of the courts of law. This is not a course to be recommended because of the disturbance which might follow. But the legality of it is beyond question. The squatters themselves were guilty of the offence of forcible entry contrary to the statute of 1381.[39] When they broke in, they entered “with strong hands” which the statute forbids. They were not only guilty of criminal offence. They were guilty of civil wrong. They were trespassers when they entered, and they continued to be trespassers so long as they remained there. The owner never acquiesced in their presence there. So trespassers never gained possession. The owner, being entitled to possession, was entitled to possession, was entitled forcibly to turn them out. See Browne v Dawson[40]. As Sir Frederick Pollock put it in his book on Torts[41] “a trespasser may in any case be turned off land before he has gained possession, and he does not gain possession until there has been something like acquiescence in the physical fact of his occupation on the part of the rightful owner.”[42]
CONCLUSION
In Ghana, adverse possession allows a person to acquire ownership of land by openly possessing it for a statutory period of (12) twelve years, against the legal owner’s will, effectively extinguishing their title. Proprietary estoppel arises when a landowner makes a clear promise or assurance regarding land use, which the relying party acts upon to their detriment. In such cases, the court may grant an equitable interest in the land based on that reliance, not necessarily through open possession against the owner’s knowledge.
In adverse possession, the claimant must demonstrate an intention to exclude the true owner from the land. In contrast, proprietary estoppel focuses on the reliance on the landowner’s promise, rather than on excluding the owner. Adverse possession is a statutory right, governed by specific laws that define the duration of possession required to acquire title. Proprietary estoppel, on the other hand, is an equitable remedy, meaning the court has discretion to decide the appropriate remedy based on the specific circumstances.
The doctrine of adverse possession is a powerful tool for the claimant, as under the Land Act, except for public lands, a claim of adverse possession can defeat title to land, whether registered or unregistered. This feature of Ghana’s land law appears unsatisfactory in light of the policy justifying land title registration. In Klu v. Konadu Apraku,[43] the Supreme Court, relying on the combined effect of the Limitation Act and the Land Title Registration Act, decided: “The adverse possession of the said land by the plaintiff for up to and even over twelve years conferred on him possessory title by reason of the provisions in section 10 of the Limitation Act, 1972 (NRCD 54). Such acquisition of title would prevail even against a registered proprietor of land under section 18(1) and (2) of the Land Title Registration Act, 1986 (PNDCL 152).”
It remains unclear whether adverse possession, which is not recognized as a valid title to land under section 64 of the Land Act, allows a squatter or trespasser to use it as a shield against a person who holds an indefeasible title to the land. As rightly stated by the learned judge, His Lordship Justice Osei-Tutu J.A., in his recent article on Adverse Possession: A Gloss in Ghanaian Jurisprudence (at page 6): “However, by allowing adverse possessors to rely on section 10 of the Limitation Act, 1972 (NRCD 54) to maintain an action for possessory title, the courts have effectively enabled their final judgments/orders in favor of the adverse possessor to be ‘harvested’ as ‘good title’ under subsection (1)(c) of section 64 of the Act.”
In sum, proprietary estoppel promotes fairness, while adverse possession can be seen as legalized theft.
[1] Mark Palowski, The doctrine of proprietary estoppel, Sweet &, Maxwell 1996 p.1
[2] (1995) 69 P&C R 107, 172 CA.
[3] [2019-2020] 1 SCGLR 772 (Adaare)
[4] [2021] (rees)
[5] 1996, Sweet & Maxwell p. 16
[6] [1976] Ch, 179, CA
[7] [1974] KB 130
[8] (1866) L.R 1 H.L 129
[9] Suit No, J4/55/2023
[10] [1975] EWCA Civ 7
[11] [1951] 1 K.B 149 CA
[12] [1975] 1 WLR 1346 CA
[13] [1980] 1 WLR 1306
[14] [1979] 1 WLR 431
[15] [1974] 1 GLR 1
[16] 1975 (NRCD 323)
[17] (1884) 9 App, Cas. 600 at 714
[18] Beaton v McDvitt (1985) 13 N.S.W.L.R 134 at 158, per Young J.
[19] (1979) Ch. 291 at 300-3-1 CA
[20] Twifo Oil Plantation Project Ltd v Ayisi [1982-83] GLR 881 CA
[21] [2014] 78 GMJ 1 SC
[22] [2005-2006] SCGLR 468
[23] [2003-2004] SCGLR 967 at 978
[24] [1982-83] GLR CA
[25] [1963] 3 WLR 1 at 14, HL
[26] [2023] 186 GMJ 560
[27] [1992-93] 4 GBR 1632 SC
[28] Civil App. No. J4/17/2016, dated 9th November 2016, SC unreported.
[29] [2020] 170 GMJ 644 SC
[30] Civil App, No, 4/50/2016, dated 24th January 2018, S.C unreported
[31] Awadali IV v Togbe Gbadaw IV[31], Appau JSC
[32] [1993] 1 EGLR 178 at 181C
[33] [2001] 1 WLR 1651
[34] Page 91
[35] (1977) 1 All ER 230 at p. 234 CA
[36] [2007=2008] SCGLR 686
[37] (1977) 38 P&CR 452 at 470
[38] [1973] Ch. 447 at 455s
[39] The Forcible Entry Act 1381
[40] (1840) 12 Ad & E1 624, 210LJQB 7
[41] Pollock’s Law of Torts (15th ed, 1951) p.292
[42] However, in Agbor v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 2 All ER 607, persons who entered secretly using a key which had been left b hind and remained in occupation for four weeks, under a claim to the premises made in good faith, were regarded as being in possession so that the Forcible Entry Acts applied.
[43] [2009] SCGLR 458
